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by Max Simontowitz, on May 7th, 2012
The current FP issue (unfortunately not freely available) features a longer excerpt from the Commentariolum Petitionis – “Little Handbook on Electioneering. The text was written by Marcus Tullius Cicero’s younger brother Quintus. The handbook essentially is a strategy memo to help Marcus lead his election campaign for Consul in the most efficient way. What I found most interesting (besides the general fascination with the fact that the book was written 2000 years ago but reads as if written today) is that Marcus implicitly uses many of the concepts employed in modern Game Theory.
Consider for example the following advice:
You [Marcus] don’t have to actually bring your opponents to trial on corruption charges, just let them know you are willing to do so.
This is exactly a deterrence-argument as used repeatedly in competition analysis or nuclear deterrence. Quintus knows exactly, that going to court could be a very time-consuming and potentially harming exercise. But he also understands that if Marcus can credibly pre-commit to always going to court if the opponents pressure to much, this will lead to an equilibrium in which Quintus will not actually have to go to court but still gets the opponents to take a step back. The key is a credibility.
In fact there are many, more sophisticated, arguments embedded in the text. For example, Marcus very well understands that a campaigner has to segment his audience and craft specific messages to each subgroup. Also, he advises Quintus to promise nothing specific, but stick to generalities in order to retain flexibility. One might even go further interpret this as a campaign for the median voter. For this just read the following excerpt:
[...] you should not make specific pledges either to the Senate or the people. [...] Tell the Senate you will maintain its traditional power and privileges. Let the business community and wealthy citizens know that you are for stability and peace. Assure the common people that you have always been on their side [...]
In other words: don’t get stuck in the extremes but conquer the middle ground and thereby the majority.
Finally, Marcus employs an interesting economic cost-benefit analysis using expected values (as we would say today) in order to justify his advice to Quintus never to refuse a demand:
If you break a promise, the outcome is uncertain and the number of people affected is small. But if you refuse to make a promise, the result is certain and produces immediate anger in a larger number of voters.
Again, this argument is because it uses concepts which today are common-place (esp. the treatment of uncertainty), but – even if we are not aware of it – are concepts of modernity, not least based on mathematical advances starting in the 16th century. Certainly, it is possible that it is just the language of the translation which adds a layer of modernity over the original that was not present at the time of writing. But I do not think that this is the case. Instead the handbook is an excellent example of how some concepts have always been used implicitly, before they were formally discovered and described in terms of math.
by Max Simontowitz, on February 10th, 2012
Especially in international relations theory it is relatively common to conceptualize states as agents. For example, realism portrays states as being caught in a (repeated) version of the prisoners’ dilemma. This effectively implies that “human” properties are attributed to an institutional aggregate. In the following I want to analyze the epistemic conditions embedded in such a view. Especially I want to discuss what kind of dynamic fits best to model the play of states over time. The reason for this analysis is that static game theoretic portray of state behavior is hardly fitting in most cases. Instead we should dynamic models. But to do that we need to understand which type of models is most reasonable.
I will thereby restrict the discussion to two different dynamic processes for repeated games. The first class consists of so called trigger strategies. The most common of which is the “grim” strategy (“if you betray me once, I will betray you forever”). The other class is formed by learning dynamics where agents are allowed to somehow adjust their strategies as they go.
Epistemically, the main difference between the strategies is level of “intellectual” requirements they demand from the agents. Trigger strategies can essentially operate without any form of advanced cognitive abilities. All that is needed is a mechanism which automatically triggers are certain sequence of actions once a defined event is observed (i.e. the doomsday machine in Dr. Strangelove). Learning dynamics on the other hand require at the very least a certain memory and a choice rule describing how experiences are translated into future actions. Both strategies, however, do not necessarily require rationality in any strict sense.
The question then is what view makes more sense when we talk of states. Do states have memory? Can they learn from experience? My claim is that the answer is yes in both cases and that we should consequently use learning dynamics rather than trigger strategies.
To see that states have memory, consider that the actions of a state are ultimately prepared and execute by its bureaucratic institutions and these institutions have extensive memory – in fact record keeping has always been at the heart of their activity. Thus, this requirement seems to be met. But at the same time, the people working in these institutions are human and able to learn on past experiences. However, changes in leadership and especially the personality of the leader can lead to strong perturbations in the degree to which past experiences are translated into future action. Furthermore, learning can be biased. But these are challenged that can be implemented into the learning dynamic, i.e. through stochastic disturbance processes.
Consequently, it seems appropriate to understand states as agents capable of memory and limited learning abilities. Hence, learning dynamics may be used to model the behavior of states over time. However, as noted these dynamics should preferably be heuristic and bounded rational ones. Moreover, a certain fundamental unease connected with the aggregation of individual behavior into the behavior of just one agent – the state – remains unresolved.
Trigger strategies, on the other hand, are in my view too simplistic for most situations. If a state knows some share of the past and is able to update his strategies based on this past, a simple automatic action rule makes little sense as it does not reflect the “cognitive” abilities of the state. The only exception would be the strategic use of trigger strategies, i.e. in the context of nuclear deterrence (but one can argue that nuclear deterrence is also best portrayed by a static one-shot game).
Hence, I am convinced that using learning dynamics for modeling state behavior is epistemically reasonable and preferable to using simplistic trigger strategies.
by Gustav Meibauer, on December 19th, 2011
Kim-Jong Il, dictator of North Korea, is dead, report BBC, CNN, NYTimes, Korean sites and other important networks. The dictator apparently suffered another stroke while travelling by train through his empoverished, isolated country.
The important questions are: what will this mean for the country, for the relations with the south, for the stability of the region?
Firstly, it can be assumed that his son (in his late 20s) will grasp for the power. But will this go smoothly? Could the military leadership take over? North Korea is a big white spot on the map when it comes to organizational and institutional structure, but it can be presumed that, in this ridiculously armed country, the military may well be one of the few properly functioning administrations. A unstable transitional period has major repercussions for the neighboring countries, particularly South Korea, that has raised its military alert instantaneously (WATCHCON 3 right now, 2 possible by tomorrow). The South Korean stock market has already reacted violently. A spillover of instability, and possibly thousands of refugees in the case that military factions begin to fight each other or the border guards defect: a nightmare for Seoul, especially since its northern neighbor holds nuclear weapons.
On the other hand, this is a very rare window of opportunity for change in this stagnant country. North Korea is ridiculously poor, isolated, and totally dependent on China: the PRC must leverage its influence for stability in the next weeks, and could try to pressure the new regime to a more beneficial stance. The six-party talks could resume. But I believe high hopes for democracy or even actual change are rather misguided. The new regime cannot dare to look weak, and at least in the first weeks, the shadow of the “great leader” will still be very present. After all we know, the North Koreans have been brainwashed in favor of this dictatorship for decades now. I assume that Kim-Jong Il’s son must establish himself as a credible leader as soon as possible, and that could prove dangerous for the stability of the region if such credibility comes from outward aggressiveness rather than internal change. I hope the best for the next days and weeks to come: another dictator falls in 2011. This year will truely go down in history.
by Max Simontowitz, on December 3rd, 2011
Given the not ending stream of new “horror scenarios” for the future of the Euro and Europe as a whole, it seems appropriate to provide a little more optimistic outlook.
First of all, so far the Euro has not ended despite all predictions. Quite on the contrary the political regimes in almost all have the particularly threatened countries have changed in a way that makes a positive outcome more likely. At the same time, the Francogerman axis is getting up to speed with the France facing feeling increasing financial pressure itself.
Sure, the situation so far has not substantially improved. But this was also not to be expected. Still, all the so called “only solutions” a la ECB bazooka and so on are still on the table and could theoretically be implemented quite quickly. Thus, we still have the same last line of defense as three, six or more months ago. What has changed, however, is the willingness to actively move forward in European integration.
And this is what seems to me the only really likely outcome: a fundamental change of the EU itself. What I expect to see at the end of this process (that is in some months time) is a divided Europe. We will have a core and a periphery. The core will be essentially under central/northern European leadership (Germany, France, Austria, Netherlands) and be much closer to a fiscal union than the current state. That does not mean that we will see an economic government on a supranational level. But instead we will see a stronger set of laws and powers for the courts (-the obvious German heritage in solving problems). Thus we will see something like a rule of economic law on a European level which directly overrules national laws. States that violate this set of laws will be held accountable by the other states, the commission, the European Court of Justice and eventually face sanctions – economic or political.
The only truly effective sanction next to directly overtaking control would thereby be a temporary suspension of voting rights for countries violating the new rules. If this will be politically feasible remains to be seen. Especially since these rules would obviously also apply to Germany whose financial situation is not as good as it is often portrayed these days.
The situation in the periphery will much depend on whether the UK will decide to stay outside the core or not. Should it not, then the periphery will be a set of weak nations mostly consisting of the most recent members of the EU. In that sense this would correct the maybe too fast expansion of the Union. Should the UK decide to join the periphery then we would have a relatively strong counter player to the core. This could be good in terms of checks and balances. But there is a strong probability that this would ultimately hurt the UK’s interests, especially those of its financial center London.
Thus, to sum it up: I do not expect the Euro to end. While the probability of such an event is certainly existing I reckon it to be low (of course it also depends on what one would define as an end of the Euro). Quite on the contrary I see a positive trajectory for Europe at the moment. But once the crisis is ended (which will not be any time soon), Europe will look different. There will be a strong (and for some painful) adjustment for the too fast extensions of the past (in terms of monetary unification as well as in term of membership itself). Europe will return to its longer-term equilibrium state with a strong unified core and a set of countries around this core with varying degrees of association. The role of the UK in all of this is still open, though I suspect that it will eventually decide to increase its distance to the core (implying that the lib dems will again not be able to control the agenda).
by Max Simontowitz, on November 8th, 2011
The notion that war and crisis are a promoters of change has a long history. But looking at how Germany changed over the past decade gives an interesting and modern illustration to this.
By war and crisis I mean for one the ongoing wars and military engagements Afghanistan and in the sees around Africa. Crisis on the other hand refers primarily to the financial crisis and its European extension as well as to the years of economic stagnation at the beginning of the new century.
Before 9/11 Germany was strongly pacifistic with a military essentially still living in the cold war. German foreign policy was one of money and non-engagement. In Europe, consensus was priority, freely following French leadership while at the same time repeatedly giving up formal weight in order to appease smaller members. Now, this might be a bit too extreme, but the essence I think is right.
Today, Germany’s military – after already having undergone several restructurings – is finally on its way to become a professional army designed for forceful military engagements far abroad. The military today is increasingly led by a new generation of former soldiers who fought in Kosovo and Afghanistan. At the same time the public is slowly realizing that it needs to support its military, since they are fighting and dying in its name. Germany is thereby catching up with many of its Nato partners and on its way to fully re-recognize hard power as part of its weight in the world. This starts to be reflected in military and political doctrine which slowly introduce the notion of military engagements to i.e. protect trade routes.
Within the European context, Germany emerges as the undisputed leader which reflects its Economic position and performance. While the formal rules still hold that every state has more or less equal voting power, reality tells a different story. Certainly one can argue that Germany is not entirely in alignment with its new role, but at least the German parliament has so far readily accepted its responsibility for the survival of the entire EU.
The root cause for this new German power is thereby a third, so far unmentioned, transformation: that of the German economy. Instead of continuing the trend of rising wages, driven by years of stagnation and job losses the German industry but also the public realized during the end of the 90s that costs needed to fall in order to stay competitive in a globalized world. The relatively under-valued Euro certainly helped, but still this transformation required repeated and silent sufferings from the German public which had to see its per capita wealth fall behind many other countries.
Thus after close to 10 years of ongoing economic and military situations of crisis, Germany emerges as a fundamentally reshaped actor on the global stage. It is on its way towards developing a intervention-oriented military and has taken up the leadership role within Europe.
by Max Simontowitz, on November 8th, 2011
Over the last year an interesting transformation happened in German politics. Germany politics is getting Swiss in the sense that concerning all critical issues it is an informal grand coalition that decides.
It started with the energy policy after the disaster at Fukushima, where Chancellor Merkel suddenly decided to turn around her government’s position on nuclear energy. Later followed the decision on the european stability mechanism, which again was supported by basically all parties in parliament except for the extreme left. And now it seems as if Merkel might also get a broad majority for her plan to introduce a general minimum wage.
Two questions come into mind on this:
- Why did Merkel do this?
- What are the implications of it?
Concerning the first question, the obvious answer seems to be that Merkel is strategically occupying topics of the left opposition parties. First the abolishion of nuclear energy, which was a core topic of the green party, and now the minimum wage which is a key demand of the social democrats.
However, I think that this does not really capture the full logic behind it. Rather I would argue that Merkel has recovered her legendary sense for the public opinion. I say rediscovered because at the beginning of this coalition things seemed different. After four years of grand coalition work, Merkel seemed poised to get things done liberal-conservative style, even if the majority of voters did not really want tax reductions etc. This time is apparently over. The liberal democrats have been reduced to nothing more than side players.
Instead Merkel is again focusing on the “middle” of the political spectrum.Paradoxically, the debt crisis is helping her with this. High level diplomacy is what Merkel is best at and adds a strong presidential/senior aura to her person. In addition, the constant situation of emergency makes all other demands -which in usual times would catch lots of attention- seem small and insignificant.
The implications of this, to answer the second question, are positive in my eyes. Grand consensus on critical issues gives much weight to these decisions and is able to settle conflicts which woukd otherwise be dividing the spectrum. At the same time it takes away a good amount of the usual idological side battles. Now, one might say that this will lead to politics becoming boring. But first of all, there are enough issues on the agenda right now to prevent that from happening. Secondly, the feeling that the will of the people finds representation through the government should strenghten the trust into the system. And in all of the questions so far, the respective decision has been supported by a strong majority of the population – at least in its general notion.
Finally, it can only be good for Europe if Germany is internally united and able to act. Just imagine to the contrary the situation would look as divisive as in Greece or Italy. And it could easily be: fighting against bailouts could be used to fight against the current government – especially given its fragile state. That this is not happening is something we should be thankful for, and also pay respect for to all parties involved.
by Gustav Meibauer, on September 15th, 2011
The Arab uprisings have confronted the international community anew with a question that has never been comprehensively answered since almost three decades ago Peace Support Operations came to the forefront of debate in academic and political circles that dealt with international law, security and development. When the international community perceives internal conflict, threats to peace and stability, even horrendous atrocities on the ground: is then intervention, be it diplomatic, economic, or military, the only viable alternative? To specify the question I want to deal with here: imagine a situation (and that shouldn’t be too hard, in the light of the situation in Libya and Syria), a government or state institutions massacring or threatening to massacre selected ethnical or political minorities, and continue to oppress vast majorities of their population: can we stand by and watch? Does not, if nothing else, human compassion and sympathy dictate that we try to help these groups with whatever means we can muster? In the aftermath of WWII, Karl Jaspers in his famous treatise on The German Guilt (1), stated the metaphysical guilt of the bystander: “There exists a solidarity among men as humans beings that makes each co-responsible for crimes committed in his presence or with his knowledge” (p.5). To act on this responsibility would mean to intervene in Syria as we did in Libya.
I am aware, and I assume the reader is as well, that against this simple concept stand at least 10 different legal, political, economic, and philosophical reasons, ranging from broad conceptual assumptions to detail, down-to-earth considerations of practicability. Most of them are well-known and are put forward in the political discussions that encompass the decision-making process of intervention. I want to focus here on three such arguments that stand out to me because of their exceptional, counter-intuitive, maybe even paradoxical nature, which does not necessarily include a clear conceptual linkage in between them. Each of the three following short paragraphs need to be read on its own account.
“Give War a Chance”
Edward Luttak in a must-read from 1999 that came with this title(1) proposed a surprising, some may say even cynical, perspective on Peace Support Operations that is persuasive in its clarity of argumentation. The essential point is this: the Peace Support Operation that has the best record of actually achieving sustainable peace is war, specifically a war that is won decisively by one of the parties: “An unpleasant truth often overlooked is that although war is great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace” (p.36). It is from this argument the deduction follows that outside intervention in conflict, while with the best intentions, may actually only lead to a prolongation of conflict because it freezes an unstable status quo. That is, even if some atrocities may be prevented, the long-run result may well be thousands of additional deaths due to continuing flares of unsolved conflict. Let one side win and stability (though at a price) prevails: intervene and the parties to the conflict will never come to terms.
Freeriding and Exploitation
The concernment of the international community and the public with human rights issues on the one hand, and the role of round-the-clock media coverage on the other has led to possibilities hitherto unknown to parties in conflicts: indeed it has, many argue, created the possibility for media warfare to warrant groups, particularly to non-state actors, to control and enhance complaisant coverage, and try to suppress critical voices. The general skepticism about authoritarian regimes supports the assumption of the Western public that any rebel groups must, or at least should, have the support of the masses of the populace, while in fact these groups may constitute only very small minorities in their countries. This leads to the theory of rebel “freeriding”: a term borrowed from economic theory to describe the phenomenon that it may be in the interest of a specific inferior group that the international community intervenes. An example given in this respect is the unclear origin of the shells that killed civilians in what became known as the Markala massacres: some analysts claim it was actually the Bosnian military that killed its own people to raise media coverage on atrocities that could be blamed to the Serbians, and that may lead to decisive foreign intervention into the conflict.
Culture Matters
Lastly, we find arguments that question the underlying concept of peace as “a good thing” more anthropologico-philosophically. Even in the Western culture, the idea of peace as an ideal arguably emerged only with the utilitarian concept of well-being, whereas for example in antic and Middle Age Europe, martyrdom and a willingness to suffer was an important part of Christian mythology. All the “founding fathers” of Islam, including the prophet Mohammed, were proud warriors, as well as, at least in their presentation to the outside world, the Roman emperors and European monarchs of divine right. What may be derived from the general idea of this argument is that peace is not necessarily the state that is in all circumstances most attractive to all parties. The analogy here is: “Would you rather be slapped in your face, or get your house taken away? Would you prefer death to leaving your home country?” (p.41)
Conclusion
While I have not covered any of the three argumentations in much depth, it was my goal to outline the general idea of presenting challenges foreign intervention on a broader basis than just legal or political argumentation. There is considerable ground-work thinking on the very notion of goodwill as such. While much of it is in itself highly contestable, it shows that there can be no certainties in our dealing with practical situations on the ground. Even those that put forward what they think is the most benevolent, most morally routed and philosophically stable argument for helping others must be able to face, and react to, criticism that challenges not only diverse practical applications, but indeed the very basis of their thought. It is important to think beyond what seems logical, even imperative, and realize that decisions of such scope as a decision to intervene has need not be easy and straightforward to everyone.
(1) Jaspers, K. (1948). Die Schuldfrage.
(2) Luttak, E. (1999). Give War A Chance, in Foreign Affairs 78/4, 1999, p.36-44.
by Max Simontowitz, on June 15th, 2011
Recently, I have been reading two books dealing directly and indirectly with the financial crisis (the mortgage, not the European one), The Ascent of Money by Niall Fergusson and The Long Short by Michael Lewis. Both books described in detail how the financial system of the USA and by consequence the world changed with the introduction of securitization of individual mortgage debt. Most importantly, however, both authors point out that at the core of this development was a political decision: allowing as many citizens as possible to own a house.
And this policy was to some extent successful as the graph above illustrates. Starting in the early 1990s the homeownership rate rose constantly to above 69% in 2005 – higher than in most other countries. However, this came at a cost: a steady rise in leverage, e.g. mortgage debt per person. Despite the overall growth of the US population, the mortgage debt per capita increased each year from the 1980s until about 2007 with the onset of the financial crisis. Corresponding to the increase in homeownership one can see a especially strong growth starting in 1995.
The graph below illustrates this point further by displaying the respective growth rates. What one can see in this graph is that overall mortgage debt grew much stronger than the ownership rate.
This finally leads to the big question on whether the policy decision to increase house ownership was done in a sustainable way. My answer would be: no, it was not. Certainly, the ownership rate rose, but the cost was a over proportional increase in leverage of individual households making them more vulnerable to market events, such as changes in interest rates and/or decreases in house prices. In other words: the growth was not a healthy one, but rather supercharged with cheap money.
The problem was further aggravated by the fact that most households did neither have the means to diversify their portfolio (e.g., they only had property as an asset) nor did they have access to more sophisticated financial instruments to hedge their risks (e.g., interest rate swaps). This left a large part of large part of the US population overly exposed to market risk – probably to a much higher degree than any financial institution would be willing to accept for itself. And in the end this giant gamble – unsurprisingly – failed.
As a result the homeownership rate in 2011 was almost back to its level in 1980 which means that almost all the gains of the 30 years in between have been erased within just 6 years. On the other side, however, individual mortgage debt is probably still way above its 1980 level (unfortunately I could not find 2010/11 values for this). Thus, it seems fair to say that the policy of increasing houseownership has tremendously failed in that it did not achieve the desired but only the undesired consequences.
(all data taken from the US Census)
by Max Simontowitz, on May 8th, 2011
Today, I read an article in the latest foreign policy issue by Henry Farrell of George Washington and John Quiggin from the University of Queensland. In their essay called “How to save the euro – and the EU: reading Keynes in Brussels” the two authors set out to explain their vision for saving the Euro, which is something they call “hard Keynesianism”, ie. active fiscal policy in times of crisis and saving in times of boom. They contrast this hard Keynesianism with the current trend towards cold austerity as displayed in fixed debt brakes, ie. the “Schuldenbremse” recently added into the German constitution. According to the authors, these debt brakes are too rigid as they do not allow governments to take the appropriate actions in terms of economic crisis, and are therefore not sustainable for long term growth. The policy mechanism by which the authors envision their hard Keynesianism to be put in place would be basically a strengthening and upgrading of the current Stability and Growth Pact.
Now, there are three points I would like to critize in their reasoning:
- Debt brakes are not the totally rigid instruments the authors describe. First of all, the application of constitutional rules is a political affair. Secondly, the definition of deficit is never really clear-cut, leaving the government room to act. But more importantly, as long as a lax fiscal policy is vote-maximizing (tax cuts etc.), governments will always have incentives to spend more than they should, even in times of economic growth. And if we look at the current situation, it is certainly fair to say that large amounts of the debts we are talking about have been amassed not in times of crisis, but in times of growth. Of course the idea of saving in good times and spending in bad times sounds reasonable – it’s just not compatible with the democratic incentives to governments. Therefore, hard rules can be helpful as long as they are carefully crafted.
- Why exactly would a strict austerity be unsustainable for long term growth? Looking at the current evidence in Greece, Ireland etc, I would say it seems rather that non-austerity is unsustainable. The authors fail to provide evidence for this claim. Just referring to economic theory is not enough.
- Why does the question of national financial austerity need to be addressed on a European level, ie. by changing the European treaties? Beyond the fact that any major change of the treaties would be a very delicate and highly difficult process, adjustments of national constitutions would suffice. As long as fiscal authority lays with the nation states, fiscal regulation should also be addressed at this level. The track record of the Stability and Growth Pact shows what happens, when fiscal policy is regulated on the European level without the EU actually having sufficient competence in this field.
To sum up, debt brakes implemented on the national level, designed to fit the individual national context and allowing sufficient room for fiscal policy in times of hard crisis, are certainly not perfect economic tools. But they are relatively easy to create, implement, and enforce. Hard Keynesianism is neither of those. Moreover, claiming that austerity is not beneficial to long-term growth seems hardly a valid claim in these times. If at all, than austerity might hurt in the short and medium term – but, given the financial problems of the peripheral countries, using active fiscal policy in my eyes does not really constitute a serious alternative. In the end, spending too much over too many years is what created the current problems and not the opposite.
by Gustav Meibauer, on April 24th, 2011
Resolution 1973, passed on March 17, 2011, authorized UN member states to “take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas” in Libya by establishing a no-fly zone and enforcing an arms embargo against Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi’s regime. This is seen as an expression of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm, invented in the early years of the millennium and adopted unanimously by the 2005 World Summit Outcome. The R2P is “the responsibility of the international community to ‘help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity’” (Doyle 2011, The Folly of Protection).
Yet, there are two fundamental, also legal, problems with the functioning of R2P embedded within the UN system.
First is the principle of non-intervention, expressed by the UN Charter. “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” has been a principle of interstate relations since the Thirty Years’ War, and has therefore been underlined by the Charter. This non-intervention principle can only be overruled by action under Chapter VII of the Charter, insofar as the Security Council is authorized to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and act to “maintain or restore international peace and security” (ibid.). The actual practice of the Security Council with regard to such “threats” has been unsteady, yet we perceive a tendency towards a more casual interpretation of what actually is a danger to international peace especially after the Cold War. The problem was, in these cases, that a certain uneasy feeling about the actual legality of interventions in Haiti, Cambodia, Iraq, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, and the former Republic of Yugoslavia, which culminated in the R2P doctrine. The R2P document lists four situations in which non-intervention is overruled even if a threat to international peace under Chapter VII is debatable. These are genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. It has to be understood, however, that R2P is only a GA recommendation, not a formal change to the Charter, which is a fundamental judicial problem (ibid.).
Second is the willingness to pursue R2P and the idea of human security entrenched with it by the international community, and especially their willingness to bear the costs of this implementation. Resolution 1973 only allows for a no-fly zone and a protection of civilians. Are these two measures and the military means that are allowed for their enforcement enough to solve the situation in Libya, so that the Libyan population can live in peace? Obama, Sarkozy and Cameron have called for the immediate resignation of Qaddafi as the only possible way to conclude the conflict. If we follow this interpretation, than the R2P norm would ask for an ouster of the Libyan leadership. It is commonly understood, however, that, firstly, the other Security Council members would not support such a resolution, and that, second, the no-fly zone and its accompanying measures apparently do not suffice to reach that goal. But remember the case of Kosovo, in which a NATO engagement has been operated without sufficient legal authorization by the Security Council with the goal of immediate conflict solution. This engagement has later been labeled “illegal, but legitimate” by the 1999 Kosovo Commission. If that was the case at that time, what exactly restrains the Alliance from enforcing R2P in Libya to what has been identified the only possible end by the heads of the USA, France, and Great Britain?
I would like to argue that apart from the explicit exclusion of ground forces by resolution 1973 (explicitly excluded exactly because of the consideration made above), resolution 1973 has been limited to a no-fly zone and protection of civilians by means of air strikes because of a down-to-earth cost-benefit-calculation. Included in this calculation are both immaterial and material cost considerations that have led the states to limit their intervention, many of which have already been outlined by Max in his last article on “Getting the Mission Right”.
Firstly, immaterial costs of an all-out intervention with ground forces to overthrow the current regime and aid the rebels would damage the international reputation of the Alliance because of an overt breach with other Security Council members. Another occupation of an Islamic country by Western troops can have severe ideological backlashes in the form of growing Al-Qaida support in other countries, such as Afghanistan and Iraq (which is why the Alliance tried to gain as much support from non-Western countries as possible, especially from the Arab League and the African Union). Public support for military interventions in foreign countries tends to be extremely low in Western countries because of the experiences made in the two countries.
Secondly, a no-fly zone and air bombardment of Qaddafi units with the goal of protection of civilians is the most convenient way of an international convention in this case. The risk of loss in military material and personnel is close to zero. The costs of limited air strikes from allied bases in Europe and from ships in the Mediterranean are, I assume, comparatively low to those of employing, supporting and supplying thousands of ground forces in the vast Libyan territory (I do not have exact figures here, it seemed rather logical to me though). The Libyan air defense has so far been incapable of shooting down even one allied fighter, which is unsurprising when comparing the different technology levels.
Thus, the no-fly zone is not the consequent transfer of R2P into a real-world civil war battleground. Instead, I argue that the current situation in Libya is determined to a great part by simple cost-benefit calculations by the allied states, no matter what lofty speeches President Sarkozy holds. And is that a bad thing? Probably not. Instead, it shows that state actors do behave rationally and carefully, which after all, can be a very good thing in a world of ongoing conflict.
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